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Guide

What is Privileged Access Management?

Privileged Access Management is the discipline of controlling, monitoring and auditing access to accounts, roles and systems that can materially change an environment.

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Privileged Access Management is the discipline of controlling, monitoring and auditing access to accounts, roles and systems that can materially change an environment. A privileged action might be opening a root shell on a Linux host, joining an RDP session as a server administrator, checking out a database credential, changing a Kubernetes cluster, or assigning a powerful cloud role. The common thread is impact: if the action succeeds, it can alter production, expose data or weaken controls.

Why PAM exists

Most organisations begin with simple identity controls: employees sign in, groups grant access, and administrators receive broader permissions because their work is urgent. That model is easy to start but hard to govern. Admin rights can accumulate over years, shared credentials are passed between teams, and emergency exceptions become permanent because nobody owns the cleanup. PAM adds a management layer around this high-impact access so that privilege is granted deliberately, observed while it is used and removed when it is no longer needed.

PAM is not only about vaulting passwords. Vaults remain useful because many systems still need credentials, but mature programs also handle passwordless sessions, cloud roles, local administrator rights, service accounts, break-glass workflows, vendor access, machine identities and audit evidence. A good design lets operators get work done without making every sensitive network or credential directly reachable from their laptop.

Core controls

The first control is discovery. Teams need to know which accounts, keys, certificates, groups and roles are privileged before they can govern them. Discovery should include servers, databases, directories, cloud providers, CI/CD systems and Kubernetes clusters. The second control is request and approval. Users should explain why they need access, which target they need, and how long they need it. The approver should see enough context to decide whether the request is normal, risky or tied to a ticket.

The third control is session brokering. Instead of handing out secrets or opening network paths broadly, a broker can connect an approved user to an approved target for a defined period. The fourth control is recording and audit. Sensitive sessions should produce evidence: who requested, who approved, which MFA method was used, what target was reached, when the grant expired and where the recording can be reviewed. The fifth control is revocation. Privilege should end automatically; cleanup should not depend on a person remembering to remove a group membership later.

Vault-centric and brokered models

Traditional PAM deployments often started with a credential vault. Users checked out a password, used it directly, and checked it back in so the system could rotate it. That approach is still relevant for legacy systems, but it leaves gaps. The user may still see the secret, the target may still need to be reachable, and the audit trail may not capture what happened inside the session. Brokered access reduces those gaps by mediating the connection itself and keeping the credential or token out of the operator's hands.

A brokered model is especially useful when combined with just-in-time access. The user requests a short window, the policy engine checks MFA and approvals, the broker creates the session, and the grant expires automatically. This does not remove the need for identity providers or ticketing systems. It connects them to the actual privileged action so that evidence is coherent.

Human, vendor and machine access

Human administrators are the obvious PAM audience, but they are not the only one. Vendors may need temporary access to a specific production host or database. A safe vendor workflow uses named accounts, expiry dates, MFA, approvals and recorded sessions. Break-glass access is another special case. It must be available in emergencies, but the emergency path should still be time-bound and heavily audited so it does not become an invisible bypass.

Machine identities also need governance. CI/CD systems often deploy infrastructure or retrieve secrets. Modern designs prefer OIDC federation and short-lived credentials over static tokens stored in pipeline variables. A PAM program should make it clear which service accounts exist, what they can do, where secrets are stored, when rotations happen and how anomalous use is detected.

Recording and privacy

Session recording is powerful evidence, but it must be introduced transparently. Customers deploying a PAM program should notify their users that privileged sessions may be recorded, define who can view recordings, and apply retention rules that match policy and law. Recordings should be searchable for operational response, but access to them should itself be governed and logged. Live view and session sharing can help incident response, provided those actions are visible in the audit trail.

Cloud infrastructure and PAM

Cloud platforms changed the meaning of privilege. A user may not have an admin password but may still be able to assume a role, attach a policy, modify a service account or move laterally through a chain of entitlements. PAM therefore overlaps with Cloud Infrastructure Entitlement Management. The access program should show not only whether a user is an administrator today, but whether they can become one through combinations of permissions.

Implementation sequence

A practical rollout starts with the highest-risk targets rather than every system at once. Choose production servers, databases, Kubernetes clusters and cloud roles where standing privilege is most sensitive. Inventory privileged accounts and groups, define approval policies, connect MFA, pilot brokered sessions, then add recording review and certification campaigns. Keep the design simple enough that teams actually use it during incidents.

Measure operational friction as well as risk reduction. If access takes too long, teams will route around it. If approvals lack context, approvers will rubber-stamp. If recordings are hard to find, audit evidence will remain manual. The best PAM programs make the safe path the easiest path.

How Access Dealer fits

Access Dealer implements this model as a PAM and CIEM SaaS. Each customer receives its own workspace at https://<company>.access-dealer.com. The service brokers SSH, browser RDP, PostgreSQL, MySQL, Microsoft SQL Server and Kubernetes sessions through an outbound-only broker in the customer network using an mTLS tunnel. It includes a credential vault with per-tenant envelope encryption, mandatory MFA, just-in-time requests and approvals, searchable recordings, live view, append-only audit, SIEM export, webhooks and access certification campaigns.

Access Dealer Elevate extends the same idea to local administrator rights on Linux, Windows and macOS servers. A user receives temporary sudo, Administrators or admin membership after a second person approves, and the agent removes that access automatically on expiry, even if the server is offline. For cloud environments, CIEM analysis highlights over-privilege and privilege-escalation paths so that PAM decisions consider more than a single login.